Optimal Endowments of Public Investment: An Empirical Analysis for the Spanish Regions by Óscar Bajo Rubio et al.
centrA:  
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces 
                                                
 
 
Documento de Trabajo 
Serie Economía E2002/14 
 
Optimal Endowments of Public Investment: An Empirical 
Analysis for the Spanish Regions
∗ 
 
Óscar Bajo Rubio    Carmen Díaz Roldán      M.Dolores Montávez 
U. de Castilla-La Mancha  U. de Castilla-La Mancha     Garcés 
                                                                            U. Pública de Navarra 
RESUMEN 
Las políticas de infraestructuras a nivel regional, a través de aumentos de la 
inversión pública, son ampliamente utilizadas para promover el desarrollo de las 
regiones más pobres en los países europeos. En este trabajo tratamos de obtener 
alguna evidencia sobre la provisión óptima del capital público para el caso de las 
regiones españolas, durante el periodo 1965-1995. Para ello, se deriva una 
condición sencilla de optimalidad a partir de un modelo de crecimiento, esto es, que 
las productividades marginales de capital privado y capital público sean iguales. 
Tras estimar una sencilla función de producción, comparamos los valores obtenidos 
para ambas productividades marginales, lo que nos permitirá inferir si la dotación 
de capital público en las regiones españolas resulta excesiva o insuficiente, con 
respecto a la dotación de capital privado. 
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ABSTRACT 
Regional infrastructures policies, through an increased public investment, are 
widely used to promote the development of poorer regions in the European 
countries. In this paper we try to find some evidence on the optimality in the 
provision of government capital for the case of the Spanish regions, during the 
period 1965-1995. To this end, a simple optimality condition is derived from an 
optimization growth model, namely, that marginal products of private and public 
capital should be equal. By comparing the values of both marginal products, 
obtained from the estimation of a simple production function, we should be able to 
infer whether the public capital stock in the Spanish regions is underprovided or 
not, relative to the private capital stock. 
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OPTIMAL ENDOWMENTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT: AN  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE SPANISH REGIONS 
  
1. Introduction 
Following Aschauer’s (1989) influential contribution, the role of public investment has been 
stressed as a crucial factor leading to higher private capital productivity, which would lead in 
turn to higher growth rates. According to this author, the decline in productivity growth 
experienced by the US economy during the seventies would have been explained to a great 
extent by the decrease in the provision of public infrastructures during that period. In this way, 
the following years witnessed the appearance of a great amount of empirical literature that 
analysed the impact of public investment on economic growth; a comprehensive survey of that 
literature can be found in Sturm, Kuper and de Haan (1998). 
 
  Although the first empirical studies made use of aggregate time series for countries, this 
approach has been also extended to a regional framework using panel data, obtaining results that 
were quantitatively lower than those found with aggregate data [see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin (1994)]. 
The reason would be the spillover effects related to the regional endowments of public capital, 
whose effect would extend not only to the own region, but also to the neighbouring regions. In 
any case, public infrastructures seem to play an important role in the growth process of regions 
that should not be neglected  (Button, 1998). 
 
  On the other hand, the issue of the optimal endowments of public infrastructure has not 
been the subject of extensive research. In principle, the impact of public investment on 
economic performance should depend on the stage of development of the economy. For 
instance, in an empirical analysis for Sweden, Berndt and Hansson (1992) pointed that, since, 
according to their estimates, public infrastructure capital would have been above its optimal 
level, this could help to explain the relatively weak effect found for the latter on productivity 
growth. On the contrary, in a less advanced country such as Spain, a higher investment effort 
by the public sector should be more effective.  2 
 
A recent contribution by Karras (1997) develops a simple condition to assess whether 
public capital is optimally provided, namely, whether the marginal products of both private and 
public capital are equal or not. By estimating a simple growth equation for fifteen European 
countries during the period 1960-1992, he was unable to reject the null hypothesis that the 
marginal products of private and public capital were equal, so that government investment 
would be neither underprovided nor overprovided in the fifteen countries of his sample. 
 
In this paper we try to address this issue (i.e., whether the endowments of public 
investment are optimal or not) in a regional framework, using Spanish data for the period 
1965-95. Unlike Karras (1997), who assumes that the production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale in all factors, we will generalise his optimality condition without needing this 
constraint. On the other hand, it is well known that regional infrastructures policies, through 
an increased public investment, are widely used to promote the development of poorer 
regions in the European Union (EU) countries. Hence, the approach of this paper can serve as 
a simple benchmark to analyse the optimality of such policies at the regional level. In this 
sense, the Spanish economy can provide an interesting case of study, since she has 
experienced a sustained period of growth in the last forty years, which has been accompanied 
by a strong process of structural change and a large increase in public investment figures. 
However, these developments have not prevented that large regional disparities still remain, 
which could justify some redistributive actions through a regional infrastructures policy. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the theoretical condition under which 
public capital would be optimally provided is derived from an optimization growth model. In 
section 3, we provide an empirical application of the model, for the case of the Spanish regions 
during the period 1965-1995. Finally, the main conclusions are summarised in section 4. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we will derive the condition that will allow us to assess whether public capital is 
optimally provided or not, generalising the approach of Karras (1997). The theoretical 
framework is based on Ramsey’s optimization growth model [see Blanchard and Fischer (1989) 
or Romer (1996) for an overview], extended to incorporate the role of government capital into 
the production function. 
 
We begin by assuming an aggregate production function such as: 
  ) , , ( t t t t t L KG K F A Y =  (1) 
where  Y denotes real output, which depends on the amounts utilized of private capital, K, 
government capital, KG, and labour, L; A is an index of the level of technology. The function F 

















F  (for X = 
K, KG, L); and, in addition, we will assume that the function F is homogeneous of degree z 
(z⊕ 1) in all production factors. In other words, we make no particular presumption on the kind 
of returns to scale over all three inputs, which might be increasing, constant or decreasing, 
according if z is greater than, equal to, or lower than one, respectively. 
 
Next, we write the production function in per capita terms: 
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f  (for x = k, kg). 
 
  The output is either consumed or invested, so that, in per capita terms: 
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t = D , c is per capita consumption, δ  is the rate of depreciation of private capital, n is 4 
the rate of population growth, and τ  denotes taxes per capita. The latter are used to finance 
government capital’s accumulation following the government budget constraint, also in per 
capita terms: 





t =  , and government capital is assumed to depreciate at the same rate than private 
capital. 
 
  On the other hand, the representative individual is assumed to maximize utility, which 
depends on per capita consumption, over an infinite planning horizon: 
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u , subject to (3), (4), and k0, kg0 > 0. This 
optimization problem is solved by setting the Hamiltonian: 
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from which the first-order conditions would be: 
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  In this way, from the first three conditions we get: 
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and, from the last three: 5 
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where  k t
z
t f A L
1 −  and  kg t
z
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1 −  are the marginal products of private and government capital, 
respectively. Equation (6) is the Euler condition, which implies that, the higher the marginal 
product of private capital (net of depreciation and population growth) relative to the rate of 
time preference, the more it pays to depress the current level of consumption in order to enjoy 
higher consumption later. In turn, equation (7) states that optimal accumulation of private and 
government capital requires that their marginal products be equal, and coincides with the 
condition already derived by Karras (1997), but generalised to the case of any kind of returns 
to scale over all inputs in the production function .  
 
In this way, the latter condition would imply that, given the marginal product of 
private capital, if the marginal product of government capital would be higher than that of 
private capital, it would be profitable for the government to raise public investment; in other 
words, and assuming that private capital is optimally provided, a marginal product of 
government capital above (below) the marginal product of private capital would mean that 
government capital is underprovided (overprovided), relative to private capital. In the next 
section we will provide an empirical test of equation (7), using Spanish regional data. 6 
3. Empirical model and results 
In order to test empirically equation (7), we start from the production function above, equation 
(1), written for simplicity in a Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
γ β α = t t t t t L KG K A Y  (8) 
where α , β , and γ  are the output elasticities of the production factors private capital, government 
capital, and labour, respectively. In per capita terms, the production function (8) becomes: 
 
β α − γ + β + α = t t t t t kg k A L y
1  (9) 
so that α  + β  + γ  would amount to z in the preceding section (see equation (2)), indicating the 
degree of returns to scale for all production factors. Finally, assuming that  , 0
t
t e A A
µ = where A0 
is the initial level of technology and µ  the rate of technical progress, we can write equation (9) 
in logarithms as follows: 
  t t t t kg k L t A y log log log ) 1 ( log log 0 β + α + − γ + β + α + µ + =  (10) 
 
  We have estimated equation (10) for the 17 regions (“comunidades autónomas”) 
established after the approval of the current Spanish Constitution in 1978, along the period 
1965-1995. The data are taken from Fundación BBVA (various years) for GDP; from Mas, 
Pérez and Uriel (various years) for the private and public capital stock; and from Mas, Pérez, 
Uriel and Serrano (various years) for employment. Notice that our public capital variable 
embodies only the directly productive items included into the whole government capital stock 
(i.e., roads, water infrastructures, urban structures, ports, railroads, and airports), hence 
excluding the non directly productive items (i.e., education and health); see Mas, Pérez and 
Uriel (various years) for details. On the other hand, per capita variables (y, k, and kg) are 
defined in terms of employment (L), and valued in real terms (at 1986 prices). 
 
  There is some available evidence on the favourable effect of the public capital stock 
on the productivity of private capital for the Spanish case, both with aggregate data, as in 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993); and with regional data, as in Mas, Maudos, Pérez 
and Uriel (1996) or Gil, Pascual and Rapún (1998). Also, we have been aware of other two 
recent studies, more directly related to the objective of this paper, and leading to somewhat 7 
conflicting results. So, Boscá, Escribá and Murgui (2001) find, using the dual approach based 
on cost functions for the period 1980-93, that there would still remain a substantial gap 
between observed and optimal public capital, which would justify a further increase in public 
investment. However, when computing real and observed relative profitabilities for public 
capital, de la Fuente (2002) concludes that public investment would have been too 
redistributive, in the sense that too much public capital would have been located in poorer 
regions. Therefore, we will try to address this somewhat conflicting evidence by using an 
alternative approach, as explained above. 
 
  Some descriptive evidence is provided in Figures 1 and 2. These figures show, for the 
first and last year of our sample period and for the 17 Spanish regions, the levels of real GDP 
per employee, and the GDP share of the government capital stock, respectively. As can be seen 
in Figure 1, GDP per employee would have experienced a significant increase between both 
dates, reaching twice its initial level in most regions; the growth of this variable would have 
been somewhat stronger in the case of poorer regions, supporting previous findings on 
convergence [see, e.g., Cuadrado-Roura, García-Greciano and Raymond (1999)]. In turn, the 
evolution of the GDP share of the government capital stock would have been also impressive, 
being its increase especially remarkable after the first eighties, when the first Socialist 
government took office. 
 
  The results of the econometric estimation of equation (10) are shown in Table 1. The 
estimated equations include individual effects for each region, which would proxy the initial 
level of technology A 0. On the other hand, due to the potential endogeneity of some of the 
explanatory variables, the above equation has been estimated using the Generalized Method of 
Moments, which might be thought as a generalization of the Instrumental Variables estimator. 
This method derives linear transformations of the original disturbances and instruments that are 
orthogonal, using these orthogonality conditions to estimate the parameters optimally; useful 
summaries can be found in Pagan and Wickens (1989) or Greene (2000). 
 
  The results for the whole set of regions appear in column (1). Notice that the coefficient 
on employment would be negative and significantly different from zero, so that the hypothesis 8 
of decreasing returns to scale over all inputs would not be rejected. Both capital stocks, private 
and public, would have a positive and significant effect on the evolution of output per 
employee, with estimated elasticities of 0.49 and 0.04, respectively. 
 
  We have also divided the whole set of regions into two groups, i.e., those enjoying a 
GDP per employee above and below the Spanish level, on average over the whole period of 
analysis. This procedure allows us to classify regions into “richer” and “poorer” or, more 
precisely, into “more productive” or “less productive”, according whether GDP per employee 
(that is, average labour productivity) is above or below the Spanish average level. The results 
for both groups of regions appear, respectively, in columns (2) and (3) for the more productive 
regions (Madrid, Baleares, Cataluña, País Vasco, Navarra, Rioja, and Canarias), and in columns 
(4) and (5) for the less productive regions (Comunidad Valenciana, Aragón, Cantabria, Asturias, 
Murcia, Andalucía, Castilla y León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, and Galicia). As can be 
seen in columns (2) and (4), the coefficient on employment would not be significantly different 
from zero, so that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale over all inputs would not be 
rejected when both groups of regions are taken separately. Accordingly, in columns (3) and (5) 
this variable was dropped, so that positive and significant elasticities for the stocks of both 
private and public capital were obtained: 0.45 and 0.05 for the more productive regions, and 
0.58 and 0.05 for the less productive regions (even though the latter coefficient is significant 
only at the 10% level). 
 
  The next step would be computing the marginal products of private and government 















 are the average products of private and government capital, respectively, 9 
taken as their mean values over the sample period. According to the results, shown in Table 2, 
the marginal product of private capital would appear to be higher than that of government 
capital for all regions, and also for the less productive regions, with the opposite result holding 
for the more productive regions. In order to test whether these differences are significant or not, 
we have made use of a simple test of the equality of two means [see, e.g., Mood, Graybill and 
Boes (1974)]. Suppose we have two samples X1 and X2 of two normal populations of the same 













n T  
would be distributed as a Student’s t with 2(n −  1) degrees of freedom, where  1 X  and  2 X , and 
2
1 σ  and 
2
2 σ , denote the sample means and the sample variances, respectively.  
  We have computed the T statistic under the null hypothesis that the marginal products of 
private and public capital shown in Table 2 are equal, obtaining values of 14.46, − 10.45, and 
27.64, for all regions, the more productive regions, and the less productive regions, respectively. 
Since, in our case, n = 31, we can always reject the null hypothesis at the usual levels of 
significance. In other words, we cannot reject that the marginal products of private and public 
capital are significantly different in all three cases. 
 
  In this way, and summarizing the results in Table 2, for the whole set of regions the 
marginal product of private capital would be higher than that of government capital, which 
would mean that government capital would be overprovided, relative to the available 
endowment of private capital. A more complete picture, however, can be obtained when the 
same computation is performed for the two groups of regions differentiated above. Although the 
previous result keeps (even more strongly) for the less productive regions, it turns that the 
marginal product of private capital would be lower than that of government capital for the more 
productive regions, so that in this case government capital would be underprovided, relative 
again to the available endowment of private capital. 10 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have tried to find some evidence on the optimality in the provision of 
government capital in the Spanish regions. To this end, we have derived a simple theoretical 
condition allowing us to assess whether public capital would be under or overprovided, which 
generalises the condition previously derived by Karras (1997) to the case of any kind of 
returns to scale over all inputs in the production function. This theoretical condition makes use 
of the result that the marginal products of private and government capital should be equal in an 
optimum, according to a Ramsey-type optimization growth model.  
 
  This condition has been tested empirically using Spanish regional data over the period 
1965-1995, by estimating a simple production function, and then computing the marginal 
products of private and government capital from their estimated elasticities and their mean 
average products over the sample period. Our results showed a positive effect of government 
capital on the evolution of GDP per employee, although its marginal product would be below 
that of private capital. However, when dividing the whole set of regions between those with a 
GDP per employee above and below the Spanish average, the previous result would only kept 
for the less productive regions, whereas the opposite result (i.e., a higher marginal product for 
government capital than for private capital) was obtained in the case of the more productive 
regions. Therefore, assuming that private capital was optimally provided, these results would 
suggest that government capital would be underprovided in the more productive regions, unlike 
the less productive regions, where the opposite result would hold. The results of this paper 
would be in line with those of de la Fuente (2002), and allow us to derive a simple policy 
implication: although government capital would have been a relevant factor behind the growth 
process experienced by Spanish regions in last years, on strictly efficiency grounds public 
investment efforts should be more intensively addressed to the more productive regions at the 
expense of the less productive ones, assuming that private capital was optimally provided. 
 
  This last qualification is essential, and leads us to take with some caution the above 
results. So, leaving aside equity considerations, which could justify by themselves the use of a 
regional infrastructures policy as a redistributive device, the need of an even increased 
investment in both private and public capital in order to enhance real convergence with the more 11 
advanced EU countries (Martín and Velázquez, 2001) could be an important reason to provide a 
higher investment in government infrastructures, even in poorer regions. So, a regional 
infrastructures policy directed to poorer regions could be justified if it would serve as a means of 
attraction of private investment to those regions. In this sense, the positive effect of public 
productive investment on enhancing private investment at the regional level, found in a recent 
study using the same time period than in this paper (Martínez-López, 2001), could validate this 
conclusion.  12 
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Table 1: Estimation of a production function for the Spanish 
regions, 1965-1995 
 













































































































Table 2: Marginal products of private and government capital in 













































Figure 1: GDP per employee in the Spanish regions,  
1965 and 1995 
 























































































Note:  The regions shown in the figure are, from left to right, Andalucía, Aragón, Asturias, 
Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León, Cataluña, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, País Vasco, 
and Rioja. 
 




Figure 2: Government capital stock as a percentage of GDP in the 























































































Note:  See Figure 1. 
Source: Fundación BBVA (various years) and Mas, Pérez and Uriel (various years). 